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1Introduction
The Baltic States and Poland have been the primary focus of NATO’s assurance and deterrence 
efforts since Rus sia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In the wake of the crisis, U.S. and allied officials 
 adopted a policy approach that was heavi ly influenced by the perceptions and requests for assis-
tance coming from their Eastern Eu ro pean counter parts. Vice President Joe Biden flew to Poland 
and Lithuania in March 2014 (just as President Vladimir Putin was annexing Crimea) to meet with 
the president and prime minister of Poland and the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
He assured them that the United States understood their fears and that its commitment to “mutual 
self- defense  under Article 5 of NATO remains ironclad.”1 President Barack Obama traveled to 
Estonia in September 2014, ahead of the NATO Summit in Wales, to do the same. U.S. national 
security officials at virtually  every level have taken comparable trips, sought similar engagements, 
and received impressively consistent messages from their Baltic and Polish equivalents up and 
down the chain of command.  These messages typically include condemnation of Rus sia’s actions 
in Ukraine; emphasis of the threat that President Putin poses to all of NATO; and requests for more 
allied contingency planning and greater military presence in NATO’s east to bolster deterrence and 
demonstrate alliance strength, resolve, and unity.
As NATO and the United States seek to expand their presence along the alliance’s eastern flank, 
including with the deployment of four NATO battalions to the region and a U.S. infusion of 
$3.4 billion in 2017, it becomes increasingly impor tant to engage representatives of civil society 
(nongovernment or “Track 2” interlocutors) in the Baltic States and Poland to better understand 
 whether assurance efforts are having the desired effect and  whether the statements and requests 
of the Baltic and Polish governments are, by and large, consistent with the attitudes and desires of 
1.  Joe Biden, “Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden with President Bronislaw Komorowski of Poland,” 
White House, Office of the Vice President (Presidential Palace, Warsaw, Poland, March 18, 2014), https:// www 
. whitehouse . gov / the - press - office / 2014 / 03 / 18 / remarks - press - vice - president - joe - biden - president - bronislaw 
- komorowski - po.
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Perspectives on Security and Strategic Stability2
their local populations.2 To that end, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
executed a dialogue with local civil society leaders, security experts and academics, and govern-
ment representatives from across the Baltic States, Poland, and the United States. The end result is 
a richer understanding among all parties regarding the shared threats and challenges facing 
Eu rope’s eastern flank; the perceived effectiveness of the overall response from NATO, including 
the United States, in addressing them; and the implications for broader strategic stability.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This report pres ents the CSIS study team’s key observations divided across five lines of inquiry:  
(1) regional perspectives on threats and vulnerabilities; (2) views on the U.S. and NATO roles in 
conventional deterrence in Eastern Eu rope; (3) regional approaches to internal defense and secu-
rity; (4) the nuclear dimension on the eastern flank; and (5)  future challenges to transatlantic 
cohesion. The objective of this proj ect was to enhance scholarship on the enduring challenges 
stemming from the Ukraine crisis and to enhance public discussion of the evolving nature and 
 future of security and defense relations between the United States, the Baltic States, and Poland.
The proj ect was conducted between late 2015 and mid-2016. In addition to reviewing the aca-
demic lit er a ture coming out of the region, the study team traveled to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia in March 2016 to meet with regional security experts, academics, civil society leaders, 
journalists, government officials, in de pen dent researchers and bloggers, and regional U.S. govern-
ment and military representatives. In addition to individual meetings and roundtables, workshops 
 were convened in each country to bring the vari ous representatives together and allow for an 
exchange of ideas. We also convened a two- day workshop in Washington, DC in May 2016 that 
brought together representatives from Europe- and U.S.- based research institutes, universities, and 
think tanks, as well as former and current U.S. government officials.
We view this report as one contribution to a larger and ongoing conversation and by no means an 
exhaustive review of the opinions held by citizens of the Baltic States and Poland. Further, all of the 
conversations conducted  under the auspices of this proj ect were  under the Chatham House Rule. 
Any quotations attributed are drawn from published works, not from interviews we conducted. 
While the study team endeavored to honestly and accurately capture the perspectives of  those 
that participated in our study, we recognize that personal filters inevitably create bias in reporting 
on the views and opinions of  others. Any inaccuracies in capturing the views presented are our 
own.
2.  NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” press release, July 9, 2016, http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / official _ texts 
_ 133169 . htm; White House, “Fact Sheet: The FY2017 Eu ro pean Reassurance Initiative Bud get Request,” February 2, 
2016, https:// www . whitehouse . gov / the - press - office / 2016 / 02 / 02 / fact - sheet - fy2017 - european - reassurance - initiative 
- budget - request.
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Brief History of Relations  
with Rus sia
An historical accounting of the complicated relationships between Rus sia, the Baltics States, and 
Poland is beyond the scope of this report. That said, it is impossible to understand the perspec-
tives of the Polish and Baltic populations without first being aware of a few key events from the 
past that continue to shape relations  today.
BALTIC STATES
While  there are a number of  factors that differentiate each of the three Baltic States, the region  
as a  whole shares a deep and intertwined history with Rus sia. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia— 
incorporated into the Rus sian Empire in the 18th  century— gained their in de pen dence at the 
tumultuous conclusion of World War I and the Rus sian Revolution. The Baltic States emerged as 
modern nation- states in the early 1920s, but their in de pen dence was short- lived. All three states 
 were invaded and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, occupied by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 
1944, and then reoccupied by the Soviets  toward the end of World War II. The Soviet annexation 
of the Baltic States was never recognized as legitimate by the United States and many Eu ro pean 
powers. Over the following de cades, the Baltic States experienced the shared trauma of mass 
exiles, forced collectivization, linguistic- cultural Russification, and attempts to extinguish their 
national identities.
The Baltic States also share a similar liberation experience. Anti- Soviet protest movements began 
in all three states in 1988, and in 1989 the citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania staged a  human 
“Baltic Chain” across the region as a nonviolent demonstration against Soviet rule. As the Soviet 
system weakened, Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to declare in de pen dence in 1990, quickly 
followed by Estonia and Latvia. Moscow undertook a violent crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia in 
January 1991. The collapsing Soviet Union was unable to halt the momentum of Baltic in de pen-
dence, and  after the failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991, the three countries’ 
in de pen dence was recognized by Western countries as well as the Soviet Union.
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Following in de pen dence, the Baltic States followed a pro- Western path that culminated in all three 
countries joining the Eu ro pean Union (EU) and NATO in 2004. The po liti cal situation in the Baltic 
States and their relationships with Rus sia are complicated by the fact that all three countries con-
tain ethnic Rus sian minority populations. According to demographic data collected in 2011, ethnic 
Rus sians account for 25  percent of the population in Estonia, 26  percent in Latvia, and 6  percent in 
Lithuania.1 Prior to the Soviet annexation, all of the Baltic States had relatively small Rus sian popu-
lations. Upon annexation, Soviet authorities encouraged Rus sians to move to the Baltics ostensibly 
to support industrialization efforts, though some regional historians view the policy as a way to 
“exterminate all obvious manifestations of ethnic historical survival.”2 Lithuania was not as greatly 
populated with ethnic Rus sians during the Soviet period  because the demand for industrial workers 
was already greatly filled by the native Lithuanian population, and to this day Lithuania has a signifi-
cantly smaller percentage of Rus sians than its Baltic neighbors.3 The presence of  these populations 
has been used by Rus sia as pretext for involvement in the Baltic region; Rus sian troops remained in 
Lithuania  until 1993 and in Estonia and Latvia  until 1994 allegedly, in part, to guarantee the security 
of the states’ ethnic Rus sians postindependence.4
The po liti cal weight of ethnic Rus sian minorities is arguably the most pronounced in Latvia. In 
recent years, the country has seen increased support for the center- left Harmony party, which has 
traditionally drawn its support from Latvia’s ethnically Rus sian citizens. Rus sian support for the 
Harmony party has been described by opponents as pushing for a “ little green president.”5 In 2014, 
the party received more votes than any other single party in the parliamentary elections, winning 
24 of 100 parliamentary seats; however, no other party was willing to join it in a co ali tion given its 
ties to Putin’s United Rus sia party.6 That Harmony was able to garner such a large percentage of 
the vote despite almost 30  percent of the ethnic Rus sian population remaining disenfranchised— 
due to  either a personal choice to remain a “noncitizen” or the restrictive Latvian language and 
history tests needed to become a citizen—is noteworthy.7
1.  “Estonia,” “Latvia,” and “Lithuania,” The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), 
https:// www . cia . gov / library / publications / the - world - factbook / .
2.  Dina Zisserman- Brodsky, Construction Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat, Deprivation, and the Rise of 
Ethnic Nationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 94; Andrejs Plankans, A Concise History of the Baltic States 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Marina Best, “The Ethnic Rus sian Minority: A Problematic Issue in the 
Baltic States,” Verges: Germanic & Slavic Studies in Review 2, no. 1 (2013): 33–41.
3.  Plankans, A Concise History of the Baltic States; Best, “The Ethnic Rus sian Minority”; Aldis Purs, Baltic Facades 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2012).
4.  Rita P. Peters, “Rus sia, the Baltic States and the West,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post- Soviet Democ ratization 
2, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 623–624.
5.  Janis Kazocins, “ Will Latvia Be Putin’s Next Victim?,” in Latvian Foreign and Security Policy: Yearbook 2015, ed. Andris 
Sprūds and Diāna Potjomkina (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 71–78.
6.  “How to Deal with Harmony,” Economist, October 6, 2014, http:// www . economist . com / blogs / easternapproaches 
/ 2014 / 10 / latvias - election.
7.  David Klion, “Latvian Election Results Underscore Regional Tensions with Rus sia,” World Politics Review, October 10, 
2014, http:// www . worldpoliticsreview . com / trend - lines / 14184 / latvian - election - results - underscore - regional - tensions 
- with - russia.
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Estonia has also experienced ethnic frictions in recent years. In 2007, an effort by the Estonian 
government to relocate a Soviet- era memorial dedicated to Red Army soldiers in World War 
II— which some ethnic Estonians believed symbolized the Soviet occupation— triggered violent 
protests by ethnic Rus sians in Tallinn.8 Estonia’s ethnic Rus sian community opposed the reloca-
tion, viewing the memorial as a symbol of the sacrifices made during the Soviet victory over Nazi 
Germany and the move as an affront to their rights within Estonian society. The relocation of the 
memorial was strongly criticized by the Kremlin and the Rus sian Duma voted for sanctions to be 
imposed on Estonia.9 The protests in Tallinn, which became known as Bronze Night,  were coupled 
with a series of crippling cyberattacks believed to have originated in Rus sia.10
The Baltic States have more recently found themselves the target of Rus sian airspace violations, 
threatening statements, and numerous military exercises (sometimes conducted without any 
advance notice) in proximity to their borders, such as a March 2015 snap exercise that brought 
80,000 Rus sian troops to full combat readiness.11 In addition, the Baltics  were warned that if they 
chose to take part in NATO plans for missile defense systems, they would be considered “targets” 
by Rus sia’s military.12
POLAND
Throughout the Cold War, communist Poland experienced waves of po liti cal and social unrest 
aimed at the oppressive policies of the Soviet- backed regime. The Polish  people regularly took 
to the streets to protest communist leadership, beginning with the Poznań Uprising of 1956 and 
culminating with the Solidarity movement that began in 1980 and stretched across the de cade.13 
Government security forces  were frequently called on to put down the protests, often leading to 
violent clashes.14 The protests and the bloody reprisals they elicited from the Soviet- backed au-
thorities are memorialized throughout Poland  today and remain fresh in the minds of the Polish 
 people.
Since the collapse of Poland’s communist regime in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union, Polish 
relations with Rus sia can be characterized as generally negative. A 2015 Pew Research poll shows 
8.  “Tallinn Tense  after Deadly Riots,” BBC News, April 28, 2007, http:// news . bbc . co . uk / 2 / hi / europe / 6602171 . stm.
9.  Steven Lee Myers, “Estonia Removes Soviet- era War Memorial  after a Night of Vio lence,” New York Times, April 27, 
2007, http:// www . nytimes . com / 2007 / 04 / 27 / world / europe / 27iht - estonia . 4 . 5477141 . html.
10.  See Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses,” in 
“Strategic Security in the Cyber Age,” special issue, Journal of Strategic Studies 4, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 49–60.
11.  Agence France- Presse, “Rus sia Expands Military Exercises to 80,000 Troops,” Defense News, March 19, 2015, 
http:// www . defensenews . com / story / defense / international / europe / 2015 / 03 / 19 / russia - expands - military - exercises 
- troops / 25023979 / .
12.  Thomas Barrabi, “Rus sia Warns Baltic States NATO’s Anti- Missile Shield  Will Make Them ‘Targets,’ ” International 
Business Times, June 24, 2015, http:// www . ibtimes . com / russia - warns - baltic - states - natos - anti - missile - shield - will 
- make - them - targets - 1981588.
13.  David Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Eu rope (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2005).
14.  Abraham Brumberg, “Poland: The Demise of Communism,” Foreign Affairs 69 (1990): 71–82.
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80  percent of Poles having an “unfavorable” view of Rus sia.15  There have been attempts at relation-
ship building between the two governments, but  these efforts hit a major stumbling block in 2010, 
when 95 se nior Polish po liti cal and military officials, including President Lech Kaczyński,  were 
killed in a plane crash near Smolensk, Rus sia. The crash occurred while the del e ga tion was en route 
to Rus sia to commemorate the Katyn massacre— the execution of 22,000 Polish elites, including 
much of the Polish officer corps, by Soviet secret police in 1940, and another source of national 
resentment  toward Rus sia. One- third of Poles believe that the crash may have been an assassination, 
beliefs occasionally stoked by Polish politicians from the governing Law and Justice Party. Poland’s 
Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski said he “cannot rule out the possibility” of malicious intent.16 
While separate Rus sian and Polish investigations have pointed to pi lot error and poor weather, the 
Smolensk crash continues to cast a shadow over Poland’s relationship with Rus sia.
One of the most contentious topics in Polish- Russian relations is the impending presence of a 
U.S. missile defense site in Redzikowo, a small Polish village situated on the Baltic Sea and not far 
from the Rus sian enclave of Kaliningrad.17 Rus sian officials assert that the system undermines its 
strategic deterrent and have labeled Poland and Romania (another host to components of NATO’s 
missile defense architecture) as “objects of priority response,” meaning they  will be targeted early 
in the event of a conflict with NATO.18 In 2009 and 2014, Rus sian exercises simulated attacks on 
Poland from Kaliningrad.
15.  Bruce Stokes, “Rus sia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World,” Pew Research Center, August 5, 2015, http:// 
www . pewglobal . org / 2015 / 08 / 05 / russia - putin - held - in - low - regard - around - the - world / .
16.  Wiktor Szary, “Polish Refocus on Smolensk Crash Could Hurt Relations with Rus sia,”  Reuters, November 26, 2016, 
http:// www . reuters . com / article / us - poland - smolensk - idUSKBN0TF0ON20151126.
17.  Lisa Ferdinando, “Work Joins Groundbreaking for Ballistic Missile Defense Site in Poland,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, May 13, 2015, http:// www . defense . gov / News / Article / Article / 759662 / work - joins - groundbreaking - for - ballistic 
- missile - defense - site - in - poland.
18.  Paul Sonne, “Rus sia Threatens NATO over Missile Shield,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015, http:// www . wsj . com 
/ articles / russia - threatens - nato - over - missile - shield - 1429185058.
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Regional Perspectives on  
Threats and Vulnerabilities
Our research affirmed the existence of broad consensus among the Baltic States and Poland on 
the nature of their security threats at a macro- level of analy sis. An overwhelming majority agreed 
that Rus sia is by far the most concerning external (and existential) threat facing the region. Other 
external pressures, such as terrorism or migration,  were generally only cited as a threat insofar as 
they could potentially distract allies from focusing on the “real” threat— Russia. While the interlocu-
tors we spoke with tended to agree that the fear of imminent Rus sian aggression— which prevailed 
at the start of the Ukraine crisis— had largely subsided, they assessed that it has been replaced by  
a per sis tent anxiety and an overall sense of resignation to the need to (re)adapt to life  under the 
constant threat of Rus sian aggression. Despite near total agreement on the source of the threat, 
however, we uncovered a high degree of variation throughout the course of our research between 
and within  these nations regarding the precise societal vulnerabilities magnifying it. The anxiety 
over Rus sia is compounded by the region’s insecurities over U.S. and Western allies’ level of com-
mitment to collective defense.
 There are three areas, in par tic u lar, that resident regional experts and members of civil society 
tended to highlight when discussing Russia- specific vulnerabilities in their nations and the region: 
(1) ethno- cultural sympathies, including the susceptibility to a Ukraine- like “ little green men” scenario 
and the receptivity of the local population to propaganda; (2) cyber weaknesses; and  (3) conventional 
military imbalance (nuclear concerns are discussed separately in Section 5). With the exception of 
the conventional military category, which we consistently found to be the most concerning to 
 those we spoke with by a large margin,  there  were widely diff er ent perspectives on the vulnerability 
each nation  faces from Rus sia. Our research revealed that the high degree of awareness and unease 
surrounding Moscow’s conventional military advantage was in large part due to Rus sia’s proximity 
to NATO’s eastern flank and its ability to rapidly reposition a significant number of forces. The 
prospect of Rus sia directing its conventional military force at any one of the eastern flank nations 
dwarfed other concerns, including  those related to lower- intensity hybrid warfare (e.g., “ little green 
men”) or  those affecting Eu rope more broadly (e.g., terrorism).
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ETHNO- CULTURAL SYMPATHIES
Sharp contrasts  were uncovered regarding local perceptions of societal divisions and vulnerabili-
ties related to the local Russian- speaking population’s degree of disaffection and their susceptibil-
ity to Rus sian propaganda and coercion. Opinions varied most starkly in Latvia and Estonia, both of 
which, as previously mentioned, contain a large number of ethnic Rus sians and Russian- speakers. 
For  those who perceive  little to no ethno- cultural vulnerabilities, Rus sia’s attempts to disseminate 
propagandistic information  were described as futile since they believe Rus sian sources are not 
taken seriously outside of Rus sian circles.1 According to  these arguments, Rus sia simply does not 
have the same economic or informational leverage in the Baltic States, and certainly not in Poland, 
as it did in Ukraine. The Russian- speaking minorities in the Baltics are more dispersed than in 
Ukraine, although  there are pockets of Russian- speaking populations near the border with Rus sia 
in northeastern Estonia and in southeastern Latvia.  There are also no indigenous secessionist 
movements among the Baltic States’ Russian- speaking minorities, which makes targeting and 
sustaining popu lar disaffection more difficult.
Estonian author Henrik Praks further argues that, in the Estonian case, ethnic Rus sian minorities 
have strong economic imperatives to remain within the EU member state and are therefore less 
likely to want to “change their status and become subjects of the Rus sian Federation.”2 Several 
Estonian observers we spoke with agreed and presented the view that it was extremely unlikely, some 
thought unimaginable, that Moscow’s so- called hybrid warfare tactics could be successfully used 
against their country in fomenting an insurrection. In the event of a Ukraine- style land grab using 
“ little green men,” the group suggested that security forces would immediately resist and open fire, 
making such an attempt too high a risk from Moscow’s perspective. This prediction of the state’s 
response was attributed in part to Estonia having learned the lessons of history: Finland fought the 
Soviets in 1939 and stayed  free; Estonia did not and was occupied for over 50 years. When queried 
about the effectiveness of Rus sian information operations, one former Estonian official offered 
that Estonians— including Russian- speakers— were “immune” to Rus sian propaganda and coun-
tered that the United States and Western Eu rope  were far more vulnerable to Rus sian deception, 
especially with “RT in  every  hotel room.”
 Others  were less sanguine and remain concerned that the po liti cal cleavages within Estonia and 
Latvia create opportunities for Rus sian information operations to stir unrest. Among this group, the 
risk of Rus sian manipulation was considered to be greatly increased by virtue of the large number 
of  people who watch Rus sian TV channels, read Rus sian newspapers, and follow other mass 
media outlets that use Rus sian sources for information. Additionally, they argue, Moscow would 
only need to mobilize a small number— “several dozen to several hundred individuals”—of Rus sia 
sympathizers to foment a crisis with the potential to overwhelm the police and military forces and 
upend the country’s politics.  After all, they add,  there  were no secessionist movements in eastern 
1.  James Corum, The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and 
U.S. Army War College Press, 2013).
2.  Henrik Praks, “Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Rus sia’s Ways of Warfare in the Baltics— the case of Estonia,” 
NATO Defense College Research Paper 124, December 2015, http:// www . ndc . nato . int / news / news . php ? icode​=​887.
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Ukraine before 2014, but one was manufactured fairly easily by co- opting a handful of  people. 
For  those on this side of the argument, a similar scenario is not inconceivable in the Baltics.
Latvian authors Andris Kudors and Gatis Pelnens emphasize the ability of Rus sian propaganda to 
cause ethnic Rus sians in Latvia to “become negatively disposed against the state of Latvia and the 
basic ideas forming it,” and underline the threat posed by the potential of a separatist movement in 
the Latgale region bordering Rus sia.3 Likewise, Estonian po liti cal scientist Juhan Kivirähk identifies 
the presence of ethnic Rus sians in Estonia as a “strategic vulnerability,” stating that  there are “two 
Estonias [which] do not fully trust each other.” 4 Some interlocutors  were critical of  those Latvians 
and Estonians who dismiss the ethnic challenge, saying they are “deceiving themselves” in terms  
of the extent to which the Russian- speaking populations in each nation are fully integrated. One 
interlocutor in Tallinn noted that Estonia’s Russian- speaking population is, in fact, skeptical  toward 
both NATO and the United States, and that Rus sian social media networks and Kremlin- controlled 
information outlets  were widespread and effective. But even  those we spoke with who empha-
sized the ethno- cultural challenge agreed that, while they can envision aggression from Moscow 
starting off with unconventional tactics, such propaganda dissemination or fomenting of unrest, 
any disturbance would quickly be followed up with a conventional invasion.
Our interlocutors in Poland and Lithuania, by contrast,  were largely in agreement that Rus sian 
propaganda had  little to no audience in their own countries due to the lack of a sizeable Rus sian 
minority that could be exploited by Moscow. They therefore felt less at risk of subversive infiltration 
by “ little green men” able to prey on the grievances of locals. This is not to suggest that our Polish 
and Lithuanian participants did not perceive a Rus sia propaganda prob lem or doubt its ability to 
cause instability— one Polish interlocutor referred to Rus sia’s New Generation Warfare strategy 
more broadly as a “nightmare, death- by- a- thousand- cuts scenario”— but simply that they saw 
themselves as perhaps less vulnerable than other nations that are starting off with a more sympa-
thetic audience. In fact, Polish and Lithuanian counter parts in the region made the point that 
Latvia and Estonia should be much more worried about such a scenario than they seem to be, 
with one Polish representative stating, “It is perfectly realistic for part of Latvia to become a frozen 
conflict, which would end NATO.” Beyond emphasizing the risk to Latvia, his comment alludes to  
a surprisingly prevalent distrust of NATO ever reaching consensus on an Article 5 response in the 
event of a Rus sian attack on allied territory in the east. In general, the Poles we met with seemed 
to be the most skeptical as to  whether NATO could be counted on to come to their rescue; this 
dynamic  will be discussed more in Section 3.
Regardless of disagreements over locals’ susceptibility to Rus sian influence, no one we spoke with 
denied that Rus sia was waging an active and aggressive information and propaganda campaign 
directed at all populations, regardless of ethnic background, throughout the eastern flank, and 
especially in the Baltic States. Lithuanian authors Linas Kojala and Aivaras Zukauskas note, for 
3.  See Andris Kudors and Gatis Pelnens, “Diverging  Faces of ‘Soft Power’ in Latvia between the EU and Rus sia,” 
in The Diff er ent  Faces of ‘Soft Power’: The Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood between Rus sia and the EU, ed. 
Toms Rostoks and Andris Sprūds (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2015). 
4.  Juhan Kivirähk, “Integrating Estonia’s Russian- Speaking Population: Findings of National Defense Opinion Surveys,” 
ICDS Analy sis, December 2014, http:// www . icds . ee / fileadmin / media / icds . ee / failid / Juhan _ Kivirahk _ - _ Integrating 
_ Estonias _ Russian - Speaking _ Population . pdf.
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example, that while Lithuania does not have a significant prob lem with official pro- Russia move-
ments and that in general the population feels integrated into Eu ro pean politics and values,  there 
is still a concerted Rus sian effort to destabilize Lithuania via informational, po liti cal, ethnic, and 
economic channels.5 In carry ing out its campaign, Rus sia relies heavi ly on two interrelated ideas: 
the first is that the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940 saved  these countries from the 
Nazi fascist threat; the second attempts to build on the image of Rus sian/Soviet forces as antifas-
cist by stating that modern Baltic governments themselves have fascist tendencies, which are 
borne out in their treatment of ethnic Rus sian minorities living  there.
 These ideas are also used to justify Rus sia’s Compatriots Policy, which applies to “individuals who 
live outside of the borders of the Rus sian Federation itself yet feel they have a historical, cultural, 
and linguistic linkage with Rus sia.” 6 The Compatriots Policy stipulates that Rus sia has the right  
to militarily intervene on humanitarian grounds in order to protect  these individuals, millions of 
whom reside in former Soviet republics. According to much of the academic lit er a ture produced  
in the region, Rus sia’s use of propaganda to discredit the Baltic States as neofascist is directly 
connected to the potential invocation of the Compatriots Policy as a pretext for annexing territory, 
as was done in Crimea, or engaging in armed conflict.7 The Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau 
report of 2012 states:
The hidden objective of Rus sia’s foreign policy is to discredit Latvia worldwide 
by: reproaching Latvia for the rebirth of fascism and rewriting history, attribut-
ing to Latvia the image of a failed state, and emphasizing discrimination 
against the Russian- speaking population. [This] is the dominant national 
security risk for Latvia created by the Compatriots Policy.8
This messaging also allows Rus sia to strengthen support for interventionist policies with its own 
domestic population, building on the concept of a patriotic and ideologically pure “Ruskii Mir” 
(Rus sian World) in contrast with a morally corrupt Eu rope from which vulnerable populations must 
be saved.9 For  those that cite a significant concern related to the vulnerability of minority popula-
tions,  these policies are the source of much consternation.
5.  See Linas Kojala, Aivaras Zukauskas, and Ilvija Bruģe, “Rus sia’s Soft Power in Lithuania: The Impact of Conflict in 
Ukraine,” in Latvian Foreign and Security Policy: Yearbook 2016, ed. Andris Sprūds and Ilvija Bruģe (Riga: Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs, 2016).
6.  Igor Zevelev, “The Rus sian World in Moscow’s Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 22, 
2016, https:// www . csis . org / analysis / russian - world - moscows - strategy.
7.  See Nerijus Maliukevicius, “The Roots of Putin’s Media Offensive in the Baltic States: Learning Lessons in Counterstrate-
gies,” in Baltic Visions: Eu ro pean Cooperation Regional Stability, ed. Kinga Redlowska (Warsaw: Foundation Institute for 
Eastern Studies, 2015), 32–43; Mike Winnerstig ed., Tools of Destabilization: Rus sian Soft Power and Non- Military Influ-
ence in the Baltic States (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency [FOI] Proj ect on Security in the Neighborhood, 
2014), http:// www . foi . se / report ? rNo​=​FOI - R - - 3990 - - SE; Kudors and Pelnens, “Diverging  Faces of ‘Soft Power’ in Latvia.”
8.  Andris Kudors, “Rus sian Soft Power and Non- Military Influence: The View from Latvia,” in Winnerstig, Tools of 
Destabilization, 81.
9.  Andris Kudors, “ ‘Rus sian World’— Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy,” Rus sian Analytical Digest 81 
(June 2010); Victoria Panova, “Rus sia’s ‘Soft’ Policy  Towards the Baltic States,” in Sprūds and Bruģe, Latvian Foreign and 
Security Policy: Yearbook 2016.
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CYBER WEAKNESS
The CSIS study team found a high degree of focus on the Rus sian cyber challenge across the 
Baltic States and Poland. Rus sian cyber warfare tactics cover a wide area, from distributing mal-
ware to infiltrating the operations of foreign governments to targeting users with psychological 
attacks based on misinformation meant to cause emotional trauma.10 The Baltic region and its 
neighbors have already experienced a number of such cyberattacks. The largest was a series of 
distributed denial of ser vice (DDoS) attacks on Estonia in 2007 amid the Bronze Night dispute. The 
attack effectively cut off access to Estonian government, banking, and media websites. Estonian 
counter parts described the attack as a watershed moment for the government that fi nally “set off 
the alarm bells” on the need to get serious about cyber vulnerabilities. Rus sia is also suspected to 
have carried out cyberattacks against key other institutions in the region, including the Norwegian 
energy sector (2011), the Danish and Finnish governments (2012 and 2013), and the Polish flagship 
airline, grounding flights at Warsaw’s busiest airport and impacting hundreds of travelers (2015).11
One of the greatest cyber threats facing the Baltic States from Rus sia is in the form of advanced 
per sis tent threats (APTs).  These attacks do not target individuals with the same goals as routine 
malware, which generally aim to steal a user’s banking or identification information, but instead 
aim to infiltrate networks and collect strategically significant information for espionage purposes. 
 These cyberattack campaigns— code- named Snake, Turla, Uroburos, the Dukes, and Pawn Storm, 
to name a few— specifically targeted government networks with the goal of creating Trojan back-
doors to allow access into networks and transmit data back to the distributors.12
As a result of  these attacks and their increasing severity and frequency, Baltic and Nordic coun-
tries, as well as Germany and Poland, have worked with NATO to conduct training exercises, such 
as Baltic Cyber Shield in 2010 and annual Locked Shields exercises since 2012. The Baltic States 
also cooperate with their Nordic neighbors in the pan- Nordic Cyber Warfare Collaboration Proj ect 
(CWCP).13 Estonia is host to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence and has 
cultivated a national proficiency in preparing for and countering cyberattacks, particularly follow-
ing its experience with the 2007 DDoS cyberattack. Additionally, at the Wales Summit in 2014, 
allied leaders declared that a cyberattack could reach the threshold of being considered an Article 
5 attack and, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, pledged to “strengthen and enhance the cyber de-
fences of national networks and infrastructures, as a  matter of priority.”14
While the alliance has taken steps qua the alliance to protect NATO’s secure communications 
network, national systems (including portions NATO may need to rely on in the event of a 
10.  Eve Hunter and Piret Pernik, “The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare,” ICDS Analy sis, April 2015, http:// www . icds . ee 
/ fileadmin / media / icds . ee / failid / Eve _ Hunter _ _ Piret _ Pernik _ - _ Challenges _ of _ Hybrid _ Warfare . pdf.
11.  Piret Pernik and Patrik Maldre, “Rising Challenges: Cybersecurity in the Baltic Sea Region,” in Redlowska, Baltic 
Visions, 44–52.
12.  See Patrik Maldre, “Global Connections, Regional Implications: An Overview of the Baltic Cyber Threat Landscape,” 
ICDS Analy sis, October 2015, http:// www . icds . ee / fileadmin / media / icds . ee / failid / Patrik _ Maldre _ - _ Global _ Connections 
_ _ Regional _ Implications . pdf.
13.  Pernik and Maldre, “Rising Challenges: Cybersecurity in the Baltic Sea Region.”
14.  NATO, “Cyber Defence Pledge,” July 8, 2016, http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / official _ texts _ 133177 . htm.
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contingency) are still highly vulnerable in many places. A cyberattack could challenge “continuity 
of government operations, including utilities, telecommunications, transportation, and the finan-
cial system, as well as military command and control, which would pose a significant threat to the 
safety of ordinary citizens and government personnel.”15 Interlocutors we spoke with assessed 
that, while pro gress has been made in terms of recognizing the cyber threat, much more work is 
needed to build the resilience of national computer systems, especially as socie ties become increas-
ingly digitalized and automated. The advanced digitalization of Baltic socie ties and economies 
was referenced in both Estonia and Lithuania as a characteristic that distinguishes the Baltics from 
Ukraine and Georgia, and which therefore raises the stakes on any Rus sian cyberattack against 
 these countries. Experts in Poland also highlighted the heightened destructive power of cyberattacks 
in the age of the smartphone, with one Polish representative describing the most immediate threat 
as “not the  enemy at the gates, [but] the  enemy in your pocket.”
Interlocutors in Poland also emphasized the need for greater synchronization between NATO and 
the Eu ro pean Union, and between the civilian and military sectors of national governments, in 
addition to less re sis tance to offensive cyber operations at the tactical level. On the latter point, 
participants at a working group in Poland bemoaned the po liti cal sensitivity surrounding offensive 
cyber operations, which they believe have the potential to helpfully shed light on Rus sia’s cyber 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY IMBALANCE
By far the most concerning vulnerability to  those we spoke with in the Baltic States and Poland 
was the conventional military imbalance between NATO and Rus sia along the eastern flank. Inter-
locutors in Latvia and Estonia, in par tic u lar,  were hyperaware of the small size of their militaries, 
in addition to the superiority of the Rus sian military and the speed with which it could invade and 
conquer if so ordered. One expert concluded that “the sum total of what the Balts can muster 
buys a few days, if that.”
A related, frequently expressed observation was the feeling that the governments of the Baltic 
States and Poland can likely “ handle for [them]selves a hybrid ‘ little green men’ scenario.”  There 
was an overall sense of confidence in the ability of regional governments to deal with low- 
intensity disturbances and a sense that national plans to resist such events have gained greatly 
in sophistication and robustness since 2014.  There was near universal agreement, however, that— 
regardless of increased defense investment— the Baltics States and Poland  will never be able to 
take on the Rus sians in a conventional matchup by themselves. As such,  there was ac know ledg-
ment that they are reliant on the United States and NATO to provide “hard power” security guaran-
tees. Therefore, much of the emphasis throughout our engagements was on the need for the 
United States and NATO to help backfill the conventional military capability and force gap between 
the eastern flank nations and Rus sia. According to residents, this should be accomplished through 
what was referred to as “day zero deterrence,” obtained primarily by what was described as the 
15.  Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, et al. Evaluating  Future U.S. Army Force Posture in Eu rope (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016), 68.
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“3P’s”— presence (of U.S. and other NATO forces), prepositioned equipment, and planning for 
contingencies.  These requests  will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.
Aside from the sheer size and closeness of the Rus sian military, many interlocutors in the Baltic 
States and Poland expressed concern over the extensive Rus sian anti- access/area- denial (A2/AD) 
network that could prevent allies from being able to reinforce the region in an emergency; this is 
part of the reason why a credible in- place presence was considered so critical. An Estonian  
colleague described the Baltic States as a “strategic island” surrounded on one side by a layered 
missile architecture in the “Rus sian fortress of Kaliningrad” and on the other by a proliferation of 
advanced systems spanning the western edge of the Rus sian mainland. He added that “it would 
require a brave leader to take a risk and fly planes in anyway.” Another observed that the current 
Rus sian missile array, combined with the absence of allied  counter systems, means that “Rus sia 
can effectively cover all capitals from Sweden to Germany.” They described Kaliningrad as a  
“win dow to the West,” which gives Rus sia the ability to “control all lines of communication in the 
Baltic Sea.”
Polish representatives also highlighted the vulnerability of the Suwalki Gap, the small area between 
Belarus and Kaliningrad that if conquered would essentially detach the Baltic States from the rest 
of the alliance.  These same analysts felt that Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, specifically, 
was being overestimated in terms of his ability to resist Rus sian demands for the use of Belarus sian 
territory as a base for launching additional deep strikes at the West, noting that “Kaliningrad would 
not be enough.” The Lithuanians we spoke with went further, claiming that the “Rus sian integration 
of Belarus sian forces is nearly complete; they are the same forces with diff er ent uniforms.”
Another aspect of the Rus sian military that stood out as a source of frequent concern was Mos-
cow’s continuing prioritization of defense modernization despite domestic economic challenges. 
 There was a widespread perception that the Rus sian military is only getting better. Many inter-
locutors felt that Rus sia’s actions in Ukraine— including its fusion of unmanned aerial systems and 
electronic warfare with precision targeting— demonstrate an increasing sophistication within the 
Rus sian force.  There was broad agreement that, while still far from perfect, the Rus sian military 
had learned the lessons of its flawed 2008 operation in Georgia and,  after studying the U.S. and 
NATO experience in Iraq and Af ghan i stan, had made smart investments in its military organ ization, 
capabilities, and TTPs. (It is also safe to assume that Rus sia is gathering and applying lessons from 
its most recent operations in Ukraine and Syria.)  These advancements have been coupled with 
notable military posture adjustments near the Baltic region: the establishment of the Motorized 
 Rifle Brigade in 2009 near the Estonian border; the reopening of the Ostrov Air Base near the 
Latvian border; and the placing of additional fighter jets at the Lida Air Base near the Belorussian- 
Lithuanian border.16
An additional source of concern was the frequency, locations, and scale at which Rus sia con-
ducts large, no- notice “snap” exercises. NATO has accused Rus sia of using the exercises to 
16.  Ugis Romanovs, “The Means and Ends of Rus sia’s Security Strategy,” in Security of the Broader Baltic Sea Region: 
Afterthoughts from the Riga Seminar, ed. Andris Sprūds and Karlis Bukovskis (Riga: Latvian Institute of International 
Affairs, 2014), 44–50.
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“deliberately avoid military transparency and predictability.”17 Several experts we spoke with from 
the region emphasized their fear that Rus sia’s constant use of snap exercises would lead to a 
numbness among allies to massive Rus sian troop movements. In the words of one interviewee,  
“If the alert is constantly blinking red, we go off guard. This is when Rus sia  will turn an exercise  
into an operation.”
The Rus sian maritime threat was less frequently cited as a source for concern compared to Rus sia’s 
land forces, though several military experts we spoke with flagged the growing capabilities of the 
Rus sian navy and NATO’s “overemphasis on land.” Polish participants felt it was increasingly impor-
tant to protect against Rus sian infiltration through Gdansk Bay and noted the vulnerability of the 
undersea infrastructure crisscrossing the Baltic seafloor. Despite the concern, however, one regional 
American expert perceived a “general neglect of maritime across all the Baltic States” and Poland, 
partially as a result of American encouragement to focus on “creating caveat- free expeditionary 
infantry forces” as their contribution to the mission in Af ghan i stan.
The question, then, is not  whether Rus sia could take the Baltics (the answer from participants was 
a resounding “yes”), but rather would they? Compared with most Western assessments that the 
likelihood of a Rus sian invasion of NATO territory is extremely low, the experts we spoke with from 
Estonia and Poland answered this question with much more skepticism. The Baltic States and 
Poland have had a long and violent history at the hands of the Rus sians; “we have no reason to 
trust [Rus sia],” explained one interlocutor. Many in the region felt a sense of validation following 
the events in Ukraine, noting that what the West sometimes viewed as undue paranoia was in fact 
justified cautious. Interlocutors  were not shy in pointing out what they saw as the West’s “funda-
mental misunderstanding [of Rus sia] and what deters [it]” and claiming that knowing Rus sia is their 
“comparative advantage.” Still, our regional counter parts acknowledged that “Rus sia would have  
to make a high bet to go into a NATO country” and that Putin takes Article 5 seriously. In short, the 
likelihood of a Rus sian conventional invasion was still generally categorized as a low- probability 
event by  those we spoke with, just not as low as the West generally assesses it to be.
OTHER VULNERABILITIES
A handful of other issues presented themselves in our review of the academic lit er a ture coming 
out of the region and in our conversations with regional experts. While mentioned with less over-
whelming frequency and urgency than the issues discussed thus far, they nevertheless merit 
mentioning  here. Among them, energy and economic dependence and interconnectedness with 
Rus sia  were vulnerabilities that  were both widely acknowledged as longer- term issues that  will 
need to be addressed.
The energy sector is a weak point for several nations along NATO’s eastern flank, although  there 
are differences in the extent of dependence and vulnerability. The Lithuanians we spoke with  were 
very proud that, for the first time since their in de pen dence, Rus sia was not Lithuania’s top trading 
17.  NATO, “Statement by NATO Deputy Spokesperson Carmen Romero on NATO Military Exercises,” August 12, 2015, 
http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / news _ 122048 . htm.
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partner and that their country had diversified the vast majority of its energy imports away from 
Rus sian sources.18 The other two Baltic States, particularly Latvia, have farther to go but are priori-
tizing efforts in this regard.
One of the more contentious energy issues in the region is the proposed NORD STREAM 2 proj-
ect. Construction of this pipeline, a would-be joint operation between Rus sia’s Gazprom and 
several Eu ro pean energy companies, would provide a second conduit for Rus sian energy to reach 
Eu rope and essentially allow Rus sia to bypass Ukraine. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite, the 
most vocally opposed among Baltic State leaders, stated that “[NORD STREAM 2] is a threat to the 
energy security of more than just Ukraine, it’s a threat to all of Eu rope.”19 Likewise, the Poles we 
spoke with expressed anger and frustration regarding the proposed proj ect, stating that it divides 
NATO and runs  counter to the spirit of the sanctions put in place against Rus sia. They also noted 
their disappointment with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s comments of February 23, 
2016, which  were perceived in Poland as essentially declaring that NORD STREAM 2 is not NATO’s 
business:
Well, I think it’s something which has to be deci ded by the nations involved 
and to the extent it affects the Eu ro pean Union, deci ded by the Eu ro pean 
Union. It’s not for NATO to decide  whether it’s good or bad to develop [NORD 
STREAM 2], so I think I have to leave that to the countries which are part of 
the proj ect and to the extent it affects EU regulations, also the Eu ro pean 
Union.20
Lithuanian scholars have likewise pointed out NATO’s natu ral tendency to focus on “hard” threats, 
as the alliance’s traditional role is as a guarantor of territorial security, and to leave it to  others to 
deal with the “soft” threats in the economic and energy sphere.21 The majority of  those we spoke 
with believe NATO should not abdicate “soft” security challenges completely to the EU or  others, 
especially given the more immediate hybrid nature of the threat posed by Rus sia. Rather, they 
believe  there is a need for ideas, including from the region, on how NATO- EU cooperation can 
advance a comprehensive security response to the Rus sian threat. Nuclear issues  were also raised 
as a source of concern, which  will be discussed more fully in Section 5.
18.  Algirdas Butkevičius, “The Opening of the Croatian Embassy in Lithuania  Will Strengthen the Partnership between 
Our Countries” (remarks, Vilnius, Lithuania, July 22, 2016), http:// www . investineu . com / content / prime - minister 
- butkevi%C4%8Dius - opening - croatian - embassy - lithuania - will - strengthen - partnership - be.
19.  “Grybauskaite— Gazprom Nord Stream 2 Gas Proj ect Threatens Eu ro pean Energy Security,” Baltic Times, December 
8, 2015, http:// www . baltictimes . com / grybauskaite _ - _ gazprom _ nord _ steam _ 2 _ gas _ project _ threatens _ european 
_ energy _ security / .
20.  Jens Stoltenberg, “Remarks at the Eu ro pean Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on 
Security and Defence” (transcript, Brussels, Belgium, February 23, 2016), http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / opinions 
_ 128311 . htm ? selectedLocale​=​en; “NATO: Nord Stream 2 to Nie Nasza Sprawa,” Energetyka24, February 24, 2016, http:// 
www . energetyka24 . com / 314847,nato - nord - stream - 2 - to - nie - nasza - sprawa.
21.  Arunas Molis and Gerda Jakstaite, “NATO’s Transformation and Energy Security: The Perceptions and Role of a 
‘Newcomer,’ ” in Newcomers No More? Con temporary NATO and the  Future of Enlargement from the Perspective of 
“Post– Cold War” Members, ed. Robert Czdulda and Marek Madej (Warsaw: International Relations Research Institute, 
2015).
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Regional Views of the 
U.S. and NATO Role in  
Conventional Deterrence
To gain a better understanding of regional expectations for allied response, the study team sought 
regional views on the eastern flank nations’ relationships with the United States and NATO; the U.S. 
and Eu ro pean approach to reassurance following the Ukraine crisis; and the ele ments considered 
necessary for a credible conventional deterrence strategy. The experts we spoke with largely agreed 
that the United States and NATO needed to shift their emphasis from the assurance mea sures under-
taken in the immediate aftermath of Rus sia’s invasion of Ukraine to a longer- term strategy focused on 
defense and deterrence. As such, many discussions centered on the need for the forward deploy-
ment of U.S. and NATO military forces and war- fighting equipment to the Baltic States and Poland. 
Opinions varied, however, regarding the necessary size of the forces, the nature of their presence 
(i.e., rotational or permanent), and the additional capabilities that would be needed to deter Rus sia.
REGIONAL VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
In general, our interlocutors in the Baltic States and Poland viewed their nations’ security relation-
ship with the United States as the safety net underwriting their defense and national security. 
Security relations with Washington  were prioritized even above NATO and close neighbors. 
Forward- stationed U.S. forces in Eu rope, or American “boots on the ground,”  were seen as crucial 
ele ments of each nation’s national security strategy. The primacy of U.S. security guarantees was 
not only evident in our discussions with regional experts and officials, but was codified in formal 
policy documents. Lithuania’s national military strategy, for example, states, “The commitment of 
the United States to guarantee the security of the region and concrete mea sures of fulfilling this 
commitment are the key  factors of the security of Lithuania.”1
1.  Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, “The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania,” 
March 17, 2016, 4, http:// kam . lt / en / defence _ policy _ 1053 / important _ documents / strategical _ documents . html.
594-66646_ch01_3P.indd   16 10/1/16   7:58 AM
Lisa Sawyer Samp, Jeffrey Rathke, and Anthony Bell 17
The importance placed by regional experts on the role of the United States in ensuring strategic 
stability on the eastern flank did not extend as acutely to NATO as an organ ization. While the Baltic 
States and Poland clearly value their membership in the alliance (along with their bilateral security 
ties with non- U.S. NATO allies), our discussions exposed an under lying skepticism  toward the 
timeliness of NATO’s decisionmaking mechanisms and, relatedly, pervasive doubts regarding the 
level of po liti cal  will that would be needed to reach a consensus for action. As one participant 
stated, “We cannot fall hostage to NATO consensus.” Our discussions also revealed resentment of 
a perceived Western assumption that defense of the Baltics is impossible and that a fight for libera-
tion  after a successful Rus sian invasion and occupation would most likely be required. In such a 
case, several interlocutors questioned  whether allies would fight at all and, moreover,  whether 
Article 5 could  really be relied on in an alliance- wide context. Given Rus sia’s proximity to the 
eastern flank, several commentators, particularly  those in the Baltic States, viewed any delay in 
allied reaction time as the difference between their extermination and survival. Most felt that the 
stakes in such a scenario  were too high to put blind faith in NATO and that the only  viable and 
capable- enough first responder is the United States. They felt that second- and third- wave rein-
forcements from NATO would be impor tant, of course, but only if Rus sia’s initial onslaught could 
be successfully weathered.
Participants’ concerns regarding the commitment of NATO (as an organ ization) to rapidly respond 
to a threat from Rus sia are perhaps understandable. A June 2015 poll conducted by the Pew 
Research Center surveyed publics in eight of the largest NATO countries— the United States,  
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, Spain, and Canada— regarding  whether their 
nation should intervene militarily in the case of Rus sian aggression against a NATO ally.2 Six out of 
the eight countries surveyed failed to deliver a majority opinion that their country should intervene 
against Rus sian aggression, while a majority in three countries— Italy, Germany, and France— stated 
that the country should not support its allies. An overwhelming number of  those we spoke with 
in the Baltic States and Poland emphasized the importance of the United States’ leadership role 
within NATO.  There was a belief that action by NATO would ultimately hinge on U.S. leaders being 
able to forge consensus and prod allies into action.
REGIONAL VIEWS  TOWARD POST- UKRAINE  
ASSURANCE EFFORTS
Baltic and Polish interlocutors  were encouraged by U.S. reassurance efforts taken since 2014 
 under the auspices of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR). The most significant effort  under OAR has 
been the per sis tent presence of a U.S. Army com pany in Poland and each Baltic State, in addition 
to prepositioned equipment and periodic rotations of U.S. air and naval forces to the region. Most 
observers from the region and Washington saw the continued presence of U.S. forces on the 
2.  Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Publics Blame Rus sia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant 
to Provide Military Aid: In Rus sia, Anti- Western Views and Support for Putin Surge,” Pew Research Center, June 2015, 
http:// www . pewglobal . org / 2015 / 06 / 10 / nato - publics - blame - russia - for - ukrainian - crisis - but - reluctant - to - provide 
- military - aid / .
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eastern flank to be necessary to ensure stability and viewed  these deployments as the starting 
point for a longer- term and enhanced forward presence.
Regional observers  were likewise grateful for the solidarity shown by NATO in the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis, though  were less enthusiastic by comparison when it came to non- U.S. NATO 
assurance mea sures. Much of their disappointment was related to the alliance’s failure to fully 
realize its original vision for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), NATO’s new “spear-
head” rapid response force announced at the 2014 Wales Summit.3 As originally conceived, the 
VJTF was intended to go beyond the rapid response forces already resident within the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) by (1) further shortening deployment timelines and (2) delegating additional 
authorities to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) in times of crisis. Neither change, 
however, could reach consensus at the level certain eastern flank nations viewed as minimally 
sufficient. In the opinion of several regional experts, the watered- down nature of the VJTF ulti-
mately fails to overcome Rus sia’s so- called time and space advantage in a challenge that they see 
as mostly about speed. One regional participant even dismissed the VJTF as a “fantasy construct.” 
Adding to  these concerns, experts in Estonia and Lithuania pointed out that the threat of Rus sian 
A2/AD capabilities could render the deployment of the VJTF to the northeastern flank nearly 
impossible at the outset of a crisis, making it more  viable as a follow-on reinforcement force, not  
a first responder.
As previously mentioned, regional interlocutors also expressed concern that continued provoca-
tions by Moscow would dull U.S. and allied alertness and that  there was already some sense of 
complacency setting in as the urgency prompted by the Ukraine crisis faded with time. Given that 
the threat posed by Moscow is not diminishing, however, they felt that shifting from assurance to 
deterrence—by emplacing a capable and robust on- the- ground presence— was needed.
SHIFTING TO CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
Our dialogues in the region and in Washington took place between March and May 2016 amid a 
debate within NATO and the United States over the establishment of an enhanced, forward, allied 
troop presence on the eastern flank. In February 2016, NATO defense ministers agreed in princi ple 
to create an enhanced forward presence of multinational troops on the eastern flank to deter 
Rus sia. The details of the presence, however, remained unresolved and  were being negotiated in 
the months before the Warsaw Summit in July 2016.4 Taking place as they did in the run-up to 
Warsaw, our discussions thus lend impor tant insights into the final decision.
At the Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders announced their decision to deploy one NATO- flagged 
battalion per country to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for a total of four.5 Each battalion 
(made up of approximately 800 to 1,000 troops)  will be led by a framework nation, with the United 
3.  NATO, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan,” fact sheet, October 2015, http:// www . nato . int / nato _ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf 
/ pdf _ 2015 _ 12 / 20151130 _ 1512 - factsheet _ rap _ en . pdf.
4.  NATO, “NATO Boosts Its Defence and Deterrence Posture,” February 11, 2016, http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq 
/ news _ 127834 . htm.
5.  NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.”
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States taking the lead in Poland, Germany in Lithuania, Canada in Latvia, and the United Kingdom 
in Estonia. While the framework nation  will contribute the bulk of the forces, other NATO allies are 
also expected to contribute forces that  will round out each battlegroup. As  these NATO battalions 
are put in place, the rotational U.S. Army companies deployed to the Baltic States  under OAR are 
likely to be consolidated and then rotate through the eastern flank to conduct training events and 
participate in exercises. U.S. training equipment that is currently prepositioned on the eastern flank 
 will be gradually withdrawn to Western Eu rope and modified to become war- fighting stocks. With 
the outcome in mind, we can assess  whether the outcome agreed at Warsaw met the expecta-
tions of eastern flank allies as expressed to our study team.
Our interactions with regional representatives highlighted a strong desire to see the United States 
and NATO shift  toward a conventional deterrence posture on the eastern flank. Several experts 
we spoke with equated deterrence strategy with a stalwart forward defense of the Baltics.  There 
was, however, a variety of opinions on the composition and strength of the forces that would be 
needed along the eastern flank to effectively deter Rus sia. As explained in Section 2, discussions  
in this regard tended to focus on the steps needed to deter Rus sian aggression in the form of a 
high- end conventional attack, with less emphasis on how to deter so- called hybrid threats. 
Observers’ remarks  were therefore concentrated on the need for allied conventional forces and 
the related questions of force size, positioning, weapons systems and capabilities, rules of engage-
ment, and other ele ments of combined military responses.  There was significantly less emphasis 
on how to best deter low- end hybrid threats or  whether a conventional deterrence strategy could 
be tailored to address the diverse set of threats facing the eastern flank.
Most participants tended  toward ambiguity regarding the size of U.S. and allied forces they believed 
 were needed to establish a credible deterrent. Instead of offering specifics,  those we spoke with 
emphasized the need for a forward presence that was “sufficiently combat capable.” The mainte-
nance of a per sis tent U.S. troop presence was a clear priority. Some interlocutors expressed worry 
that U.S. forces might be replaced rather than augmented by other allied troops when NATO moved 
ahead with its enhanced forward presence. This did not detract from the desire for non- U.S. NATO 
troop deployments in addition to U.S. forces, however, in order to “get as many flags as pos si ble.” 
Still, while regional defense experts and U.S. participants agreed that multinational forces  were 
useful in maximizing force structure,  there was also agreement that integrating too many small 
units from multiple allies could create interoperability prob lems and would require unwieldy 
command- and- control structures. It was made clear that the force needed to be credible above 
all  else.
Regarding a permanent versus a rotational presence, regional interlocutors  were generally re-
signed to stop fighting Western allies’ reluctance to permanently deploy forces to the Baltic States 
and Poland, though they continued to disagree with the logic of the decision. From their perspec-
tive, Western objections to permanent stationing on the basis of the NATO- Russia Founding Act 
(NRFA)— which they see Rus sia as having invalidated through its own violations of the Act— only 
reward and further enable Rus sian rule- breaking.6 Polish participants  were more vocal than their 
6.  NATO- Russia Founding Act states, “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the 
Alliance  will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, 
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Baltic counter parts in the belief that the NRFA should be nullified and in expressing a strong pref-
erence for the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Poland, echoing calls from the Polish presi-
dent for “as permanent a presence as pos si ble.”7 While many of our Baltic interlocutors also 
indicated a preference for permanently stationed U.S. and allied forces,  those we spoke with  were 
more acquiescent to the perceived po liti cal realities that made such a decision impossible. In the 
end, all conceded that rotational forces  were sufficient as long as they  were continuous, “heel- to- 
toe” deployments.
Based on our dialogues, the Baltic States and Poland are likely quite satisfied with the final outcome 
of the Warsaw Summit. The establishment of an enhanced forward (rotational) presence of approx-
imately 1,000 NATO troops in each country is a significant commitment of forces and resources 
and underscores a shift by the alliance  toward a deterrence posture. Estonian Prime Minister Taavi 
Roivas described the decisions made at Warsaw as “a breakthrough that unambiguously demon-
strates NATO’s solidarity and the fact that Estonia is better protected  today than ever before.”8 Leaders 
from across the region have likewise made positive statements regarding NATO’s decisions.9 Over 
the long term, the Baltic States and Poland are likely to continue to push for priority on eastern flank 
challenges and press for the new  battle groups to remain fully manned and combat capable.
and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” NATO, 
“Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Rus sian Federation Signed in 
Paris, France,” last modified October 12, 2016, http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / official _ texts _ 25468 . htm.
7.  Julian E. Barnes, “Polish President Calls for Vis i ble NATO Force,” Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2016, http:// www 
. wsj . com / articles / polish - president - calls - for - visible - nato - force - in - poland - 1453128541.
8.  “Estonian PM: Decision to Increase NATO Presence Is Breakthrough,” Baltic Times, July 7, 2016, http:// www 
. baltictimes . com / estonian _ pm _ _ decision _ to _ increase _ nato _ presence _ is _ breakthrough / .
9.  See “Prime Minister Szydło hails NATO summit success for Poland,” Radio Poland, July 11, 2016, http:// www 
. thenews . pl / 1 / 10 / Artykul / 261227,Prime - Minister - Szydlo - hails - NATO - summit - success - for - Poland; Richard Milne, 
“Lithuania Welcomes NATO Deployment of Troops,” Financial Times, July 3, 2016, http:// www . ft . com / cms / s / 0 
/ 13a8de5e - 3f7b - 11e6 - 8716 - a4a71e8140b0 . html#axzz4EsdnsoAc; Matthew Fisher, “Latvians Welcome Tiny Canadian 
Force to Help Dissuade Rus sia’s Military Adventurism,” National Post, July 8, 2016, http:// news . nationalpost . com / news 
/ world / matthew - fisher - latvians - welcome - tiny - canadian - force - to - help - dissuade - russias - military - adventurism.
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Regional Approaches to Internal 
Defense and Security
Despite dramatic differences in size, bud gets, and capabilities, the Baltic and Polish militaries all 
share a heavy emphasis on land forces within their defense structures, generally to the exclusion 
of coastal defense and maritime investments (as well as air power in the Baltic States). While Poland 
has been able to build capacity across a broader spectrum of defense requirements, the Baltic States 
have sought to compensate for deficiencies in scope and scale by contributing in small but mean-
ingful ways to international operations; offering robust host- nation support to visiting forces; and 
cultivating specialties and niche capabilities— for example, cyber defense in Estonia, joint terminal 
attack controllers and explosive ordnance disposal in Latvia, and special operations forces in 
Lithuania— that can provide a qualitative benefit to NATO.
Communist legacies related to defense organ ization, procurement, and personnel remain a chal-
lenge for Poland. The challenge faced by the Baltic militaries, however, was diff er ent: they  were 
largely reconstituted from the ground up following the end of the Soviet occupation, during which 
the Red Army had disbanded the national defense forces.1 All face strug gles in building a credible 
deterrent against Rus sian aggression. All have committed to increasing defense investments and 
are undertaking steps to better integrate their internal security, intelligence, and defense forces, 
though the pace of reform varies by country. In general, the Baltic States would benefit from better 
synchronization in defense planning and procurement across national lines as well as reinforced 
internal national guard structures.
Officials and experts we spoke with  were disappointed at the lack of military coordination among 
the Baltic States. While Baltic leaders acknowledge that any weak link among them  will only in-
crease the exposure and risk to all three, common defense planning remains stifled by the region’s 
difficult strategic geography and the need to prioritize small military forces around self- defense. 
The result is in de pen dent defense and contingency plans.
1.  See Daunis Auers, Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the 
21st  Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
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Likewise, while the Baltic States are supportive of joint procurement initiatives in theory, differ-
ences in bud get timelines, capability priorities, preferred hardware configurations, and po liti cal 
circumstances have inhibited the full realization of a joint approach and the cost efficiencies found 
therein. Ammunition is one of the few areas where Baltic militaries have been able to come to-
gether in a joint procurement arrangement, though  there are ongoing discussions between Latvia 
and Lithuania for medium- range air defenses that could usefully expand cooperation. The discounts 
available through the purchase of second hand or thirdhand equipment are also contributing to 
competition between the Baltic States rather than cooperation. Regarding Poland, according to 
the experts we spoke with, the country is similarly not philosophically opposed to joint procure-
ment programs, assuming they introduce economies of scale. Such programs have been stymied, 
however, by availability issues for major purchases, and by Poland’s insistence that any purchase 
directly benefit the Polish defense industry.
The Baltic States are also focused on improving the capacity and readiness of their volunteer 
national guard structures, which have taken on renewed importance since 2014. Baltic defense 
experts interviewed for this report emphasized the impor tant roles that the Estonian Defence 
League, the Latvian National Guard, and the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces each 
play in the Baltic States’ national contingency plans given the small number of standing forces. 
Most, however, expressed concern regarding their training, equipping, and readiness. Given the 
lack of territorial depth and the proximity of Rus sian forces at the onset of any crisis, military 
mobilization in the Baltic States must be extremely rapid and well- rehearsed.  These experts wor-
ried that se nior government officials in the region  were overestimating the abilities of the volunteer 
national guards to the detriment of approaching reforms with necessary urgency.
The following sections offer more specifics on the internal defense structures of each of the three 
Baltic States and Poland, as well as their individual approaches to enhancing deterrence and 
prioritizing capability requirements.
ESTONIA
Since Rus sia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Estonia has embarked on efforts to expand and 
better equip its small active- duty ground forces while standing up additional reserve and national 
guard forces. The Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) are the smallest active- duty military in the Baltic 
States, numbering approximately 3,200 personnel— with 2,800 active- duty professional soldiers in 
the army, 200 in the navy, and 250 in the air force.2 While Estonia spends 2  percent of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) on defense, this amounts to only $490 million annually due to the 
country’s small size.3
2.  This figure does not include the 2,500 conscripts in the army, as conscript units are placed in reserve upon completion 
of their training; see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge, 
2016), 91. See also Estonian Defence Forces, “Compulsory Military Ser vice,” November 3, 2014, http:// www . mil . ee / en 
/ defence - forces / compulsory - military - service.
3.  NATO, “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009–2016),” press release, July 4, 2016, http:// www . nato . int 
/ nato _ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf / pdf _ 2016 _ 07 / 20160704 _ 160704 - pr2016 - 116 . pdf.
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The Estonian Land Force, the primary ser vice branch, is largely structured as a reserve military 
geared  toward territorial defense. The land forces are spearheaded by a light infantry scouts 
battalion and a small special operations force (SOF) component.  These two units— the only active- 
duty formations manned by professional soldiers— maintain a high degree of readiness and have 
regularly deployed with NATO forces overseas. The remainder of Estonia’s land forces, approximately 
3,200 conscripts, are structured as a reserve force of two light infantry brigades. A primary role for 
the active- duty personnel, therefore, is to or ga nize, train, and equip the largely conscript reservists 
who must be able to quickly mobilize in the event of a crisis. Supplementing the small regular military 
is the Estonian Defence League (EDL), a volunteer national paramilitary organ ization with approxi-
mately 15,000 volunteers.4
Estonians are proud to be one of only five NATO countries, along with Poland, to meet NATO’s 
defense spending benchmark of 2  percent of GDP. Interlocutors expressed concerns, however, 
that without spending beyond 2  percent, Estonia would face serious challenges bridging many of 
its most glaring capability gaps, including sufficient air surveillance radars, short- range air de-
fenses, coastal defenses, adequate munition stockpiles, and basic infantry equipment to outfit new 
reserve units and the EDL. Still, the Estonian Defence Force is making some headway with  these 
requirements and is in the pro cess of procuring Dutch CV-90 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Javelin 
antitank guided missiles, tactical unmanned aerial systems, and basic equipment for the EDL and 
reserve forces, including  rifles and munitions.
While interlocutors spoke highly of the abilities of Estonia’s scouts battalion and SOF, which have 
operated alongside U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and Af ghan i stan without caveats, as well as 
Tallinn’s cyber capabilities, numerous discussions revealed concerns about the state of readiness 
of the reserve units and the EDL. Interviewees indicated that the  actual number of trained, 
equipped, and capable personnel in the EDL was likely in the hundreds, a far cry from the 15,000 
cited by official government sources. Estonia was, however, able to muster 7,000 reservists as part 
of the 13,000- troop strong force comprised of members of the active force, reserves, and EDL for 
a two- week exercise— Estonia’s largest ever—to test the nation’s readiness to repel a Rus sian 
invasion.5 The exercise, Siil 2015 (Hedgehog 2015), is aptly named as much of the Baltic States’ 
defense strategies rests on making themselves, in the words of one official, “as prickly as pos si ble 
for Rus sia to swallow” in order to buy time for allied reinforcements to arrive.
4.  Estonian Defence League, “Estonian Defence League,” August 10, 2016, http:// www . kaitseliit . ee / en / edl.
5.  S. Tambur, “Estonia’s Largest- Ever Military Exercise Involving 13,000 Soldiers Kicks Off,” Estonian Public Broadcast-
ing, April 5, 2015, http:// news . err . ee / v / news / defense / 6620af7b - cc70 - 4742 - a228 - 4c0324269243 / estonias - largest - ever 
- military - exercise - involving - 13000 - soldiers - kicks - off; Ben Farmer, “Estonia Stages Biggest Military Exercise in Coun-
try’s History amid Fears of Rus sian ‘Aggression,’ ” Telegraph, May 12, 2015, http:// www . telegraph . co . uk / news / worldnews 
/ europe / estonia / 11600458 / Estonia - stages - biggest - military - exercise - in - countrys - history - amid - fears - of - Russian 
- aggression . html.
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LATVIA
At 1.4  percent of GDP, or about $380 million in 2016, Latvia has been increasing its defense spend-
ing annually since 2014 and aims to reach NATO’s 2  percent target by 2018.6 The Latvian National 
Armed Forces is an all- volunteer military composed of 4,700 active- duty personnel with approxi-
mately 1,200 in the army and 2,600 joint personnel assigned to SOF and enabler units. Latvia’s 
ground forces are comprised of two infantry battalions and a SOF component. The small regular 
military is buttressed by the Latvian National Guard, a volunteer paramilitary force with approxi-
mately 8,000 members.7 Acquisition priorities for Latvia include air surveillance radars, antitank 
guided missiles, armored fighting vehicles, and short- range air defense systems.
Interlocutors in Riga generally expressed concern at the scale and speed of the reform mea sures 
undertaken by Riga in recent years to enhance its security forces. While complimentary of the 
per for mance of Latvian forces in exercises and the government’s decision to increase defense 
spending, local exerts believed the Latvian government was overly optimistic regarding the suffi-
ciency of its force structure, capabilities, and state of readiness. Much of the criticism focused on 
the Latvian National Guard, with one member of the organ ization stating that only half of its 8,000 
members could be considered at least partially  viable for re sis tance in an emergency, while also 
describing a worrying lack of structure and equipment. Several interlocutors suggested that Latvia’s 
defense spending would likely need to increase faster and likely beyond 2  percent of GDP, alongside 
continuing reforms within the ministries of defense and interior, in order to have sufficiently robust 
and resilient security forces able to respond to low- intensity crises.
LITHUANIA
Lithuania has the largest military of the three Baltic States, owing to its larger economy and popu-
lation, and is similarly structured around territorial defense, with the Lithuanian Land Force (LLF) 
serving as the predominant ser vice. While Lithuania does not share a border with mainland Rus sia 
like Estonia and Latvia, it does touch the Rus sian enclave of Kaliningrad to its west and Belarus— 
which Rus sian forces could cross (with or without the sanction of the Belarusian leadership)—to 
its east. Lithuanian defenses therefore need to be oriented against potential threats from  either 
direction. Moreover, Lithuania’s terrain is generally more open and flat than its northern Baltic 
counter parts, making territorial defense against conventional threats all the more challenging. 
Lithuania’s defense bud get in 2016 is $1.67 billion, amounting to 1.5  percent of GDP. While still 
falling below NATO’s spending target, Lithuania has rapidly increased its defense spending since 
the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, almost doubling spending from 0.8  percent of GDP in 2013, with 
plans to reach 2  percent by 2018.
6.  Latvian Ministry of Defence, “Government Defence Priorities,” March 2016, http:// www . mod . gov . lv / Par _ aizsardzibas 
_ nozari / Politikas _ planosana / Vald _ priorit . aspx.
7.  Latvia forces have developed niche capability areas to support NATO overseas deployments including Joint Tactical 
Air Control (JTAC) and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) capabilities.
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The active component of the LLF is manned by approximately 6,000 professional soldiers 
and 4,800 active reservists.8 The primary fighting component of the LLF is the Iron Wolf brigade, 
a mechanized infantry force comprised of four infantry battalions and an artillery battalion.9 
Defense officials have recognized the need to increase the LLF’s force structure and in 2016 began 
establishing a second motorized infantry brigade that  will incorporate two previously in de pen dent 
motorized infantry battalions and two entirely new battalions.10 To help support the growth in the 
LLF’s force structure, Lithuania reintroduced compulsory military ser vice in 2015. Beyond force 
structure enhancements, Lithuania is spending its increased defense investment on new capabili-
ties. It is seeking to modernize its forces with self- propelled artillery systems, infantry fighting 
vehicles, short- range air defense systems, aerial surveillance systems, logistics vehicles, and anti-
tank guided missiles.11
POLAND
The Polish Armed Forces (PAF) are by far the most robust and capable military on NATO’s eastern 
flank. Upon joining NATO in 1999, Poland focused on transforming its large and heavy Soviet- style 
military into a smaller and lighter expeditionary force capable of deploying and fighting alongside 
U.S. and allied forces, contributions viewed by Warsaw as a critical pillar for Poland’s national secu-
rity. The PAF has undertaken a number of crucial reforms since 1999, including transitioning from a 
conscript military to an all- volunteer, professional force; integrating Western military equipment 
into its inventory; and restructuring its bloated, top- heavy military organ ization into a leaner, more 
agile joint fighting force.
Poland gradually began shifting its military’s focus from external crisis management back to terri-
torial defense as relations with Moscow soured following the Russia- Georgia War in 2008 and the 
Smolensk plane crash in 2010, and as its confidence in Washington was tested following the 
Obama administration’s 2009 decision to scale back its planned deployment of missile defenses  
8.  Vytautas Jokubauskas, “The Financing and Personnel of the Lithuanian Army,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 
13 (2014–2015): 147–170, http:// www . degruyter . com / downloadpdf / j / lasr . 2015 . 13 . issue - 1 / lasr - 2015 - 0008 / lasr - 2015 
- 0008 . xml; Agne Cepinskyte, “Lithuania Reinstates Conscription: Implications on Security, National Identity, and Gender 
Roles” Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 6, 2016, http:// www . fpri . org / article / 2016 / 06 / lithuania - reinstates 
- conscription - implications - security - national - identity - gender - roles / .
9.  “Mechanized Infantry Brigade ‘Iron Wolf,’ ” Lithuanian Armed Forces, last modified March 3, 2016, https:// kariuomene 
. kam . lt / en / structure _ 1469 / land _ force / structure _ 1299 . html.
10.  “Lithuania Increases the Army,” Baltic Review, January 3, 2016, http:// baltic - review . com / lithuania - increases - the 
- army / ; Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, “A New Brigade Named Žemaitija Is Established within the Lithuanian 
Armed Forces in Western Lithuania,” press release, December 31, 2015, http:// www . kam . lt / en / news _ 1098 / current 
_ issues / a _ new _ brigade _ named _ zemaitija _ is _ established _ within _ the _ lithuanian _ armed _ forces _ in _ western _ lithuania 
. html ? pbck​=​10.
11.  Jakub Palowski, “German Boxer APCs Acquired by Lithuania,” Defence24, December 14, 2015, http:// www 
. defence24 . com / 281795,german - boxer - apcs - acquired - by - lithuania - armed - with - spike - anti - tank - guided - missiles.
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to Poland.12 Beginning in 2013, Poland embarked on an ambitious 10- year, $35 billion moderniza-
tion effort with major investments in integrated air and missile defense systems, he li cop ters, 
submarines, armored vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and command- and- control systems, 
in addition to upgrades for its main  battle tanks and fighter aircraft.13 By 2015, Poland’s defense 
bud get had reached approximately $10.5 billion, or about 2  percent of GDP, making it one of five 
NATO members, along with Estonia, to reach the alliance’s defense spending target.14
Poland’s military is comprised of approximately 100,000 active- duty personnel, the vast majority 
of which belong to the land forces (77,000 personnel and 13 maneuver brigades). The bulk of the 
PAF are based in western Poland near the German border, a legacy of Poland’s Cold War posture, 
while many units based in the eastern provinces remain undermanned. Few regular forces are 
located in proximity to the Suwalki Gap— the narrow land corridor to Lithuania bordered by Kalin-
ingrad and Belarus that many Polish interlocutors considered the most likely entry point for Rus sia 
soldiers in the event of an invasion. To augment its force structure and rebalance its forces to the 
north and east, Poland plans to create three territorial defense brigades manned by up to 20,000 
reservists, which would be tasked with securing key infrastructure and lines of communication.
Poland  will face a number of long- term obstacles as it seeks to modernize its defense capabilities. 
While Poland began updating its military stocks with Western equipment  after joining NATO, much 
of the PAF remains reliant on aging Soviet- era hardware. As new equipment comes on line, the 
higher per- unit costs as well as larger maintenance, sustainment, and training costs  will force 
trade- offs between modern capabilities and additional force structure, both of which Poland views 
as necessary for credible deterrence.15 Polish Minister of Defence Antoni Macierewicz has called 
for Poland to further increase its defense spending to 3  percent of GDP, seemingly to avoid such 
trade- offs, although such an increase seems po liti cally unachievable.16
Experts with knowledge of the country’s procurement practices expressed concerns that Warsaw 
is pursuing modernization efforts than it could neither afford nor properly manage. They explained 
that Poland has a tendency to buy bare- bones equipment packages to bring down costs, only to 
 later discover that the critical systems it opted out of  were necessary to meet military require-
ments, thus necessitating further upgrades at higher cost. In other cases, they pointed out, Poland 
has neglected to put in place adequate sustainment and logistics agreements needed to properly 
maintain its new equipment. For example, Poland purchased 128 surplus Leopard 2A5 tanks from 
12.  In discussions, it was Polish experts and officials who raised the notion that Poland’s shift  toward territorial defense 
also began as a reaction to the Obama administration’s 2009 decision to scuttle plans to deploy ballistic missile 
interceptors in the country, which Warsaw viewed as a major setback.
13.  Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland Plans to Spend $21B on Drones, Helos, Air Defense, Subs,” Defense News, July 20, 
2016, http:// www . defensenews . com / story / defense / 2016 / 07 / 20 / poland - plans - spending - 21 - billion - helos - air - defense 
- systems - submarines - uavs / 87341052 / .
14.  NATO, “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries.”
15.  Tomasz Szatkowski, “Bud get Implications of Poland’s Pivot to Territorial Defence,” Eu ro pean Leadership Network, 
February 9, 2015, http:// www . europeanleadershipnetwork . org / budget - implications - of - polands - pivot - to - territorial 
- defence _ 2413 . html.
16.  “Poland to Increase Military Bud get,” Ukraine  Today, July 11, 2016, http:// uatoday . tv / politics / poland - to - increase 
- military - budget - 693237 . html.
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Germany in 2013 but failed to acquire technical documentation for the tanks or develop sufficient 
plans for their maintenance and overhaul, which caused significant delays in the modernization of 
its tank forces.17 Similarly, Poland’s F-16 fleet was troubled by maintenance issues for several years 
due to chronic shortages of spare parts and other issues.18 While not unusual, Poland’s customary 
insistence on joint production contracts and technology transfers to support and develop its 
largely state- owned defense industry was noted as another frequent source of procurement 
delays and complication.
Beyond reforming force structure and procurement practices, overcoming the communist legacy 
within the defense bureaucracy continues to pose a challenge. Civilian control over the PAF was 
formally codified in 1997— two years before Poland joined NATO. While civil- military relations in 
Poland have advanced by leaps and bounds since, the Polish military’s deep politicization  under 
the communist regime and its role in the crackdown against the Solidarity movement has left 
lingering chords of distrust between  today’s civilian leaders and se nior military officers who  were 
trained during the communist era. Interlocutors we spoke with also pointed out that continued 
politicization, albeit less pronounced, of promotions and assignments for se nior officers negatively 
impacts morale and places inexperienced officers in se nior positions.
17.  Antoni Macierewicz, “Report on the State of Public Affairs and State Institutions as of the End of PO- PSL Co ali tion 
Rule” (speech, Polonia Institute, Warsaw, Poland, May 11, 2016), https:// www . poloniainstitute . net / expert - analyses 
/ security - policy / the - speech - of - antoni - macierewicz - the - minister - of - national - defense - of - the - republic - of - poland / .
18.  Aaron Mehta, “Poland Eyes F-16 Sustainment Change,” Defense News, June 3, 2016, http:// www . defensenews . com 
/ story / defense - news / 2016 / 06 / 03 / poland - f - 16 - sustainment - aesa - radar / 85350178 / .
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The Nuclear Dimension  
on the Eastern Flank
Nuclear deterrence was an essential ele ment in NATO policy and posture throughout the Cold War 
and remains so to this day. The alliance as an organ ization does not possess any nuclear weapons 
in its own right; rather, strategic deterrence is provided by the individual members with such 
capabilities— the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (though France’s arsenal remains 
technically outside of NATO’s nuclear framework)— and by the burden sharing of nonnuclear allies. 
While NATO has reduced the role of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War— and while 
the United States has reduced the number and types of its nuclear systems deployed in Europe— 
nuclear weapons, especially the U.S. strategic arsenal, remain the ultimate guarantee of NATO’s 
security.1
As NATO confronts the threat from a resurgent Rus sia, most of the alliance’s focus since 2014 has 
been on strengthening conventional deterrence through the rotational deployment of land forces. 
 There is a growing chorus of allies, however, calling for greater attention on the nuclear compo-
nent of the alliance’s deterrent.2 In their view, Rus sia’s troubling pattern of nuclear saber rattling— 
including targeting Poland and the Baltic States with nuclear weapons in military exercises— and 
the role  these weapons play in Rus sian attempts at coercion requires a renewed NATO focus on 
nuclear deterrence. Rus sia’s actions since the Ukraine crisis have included direct and implied 
statements designed to intimidate individual NATO allies and neighbors with Rus sia’s nuclear 
capabilities. Moscow also has tried to delegitimize NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Observ-
ers in the Baltic States and Poland  were especially concerned that Rus sia may be lowering its 
threshold for using its nuclear weapons. This concern results in part from ambiguity in Rus sia’s 
1.  NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or ga ni za tion,” 
November 19–20, 2010, http:// www . nato . int / nato _ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf / pdf _ publications / 20120214 _ strategic 
- concept - 2010 - eng . pdf.
2.  Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross- Domain Coercion: The Current Rus sian Art of Strategy,” Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales Proliferation Papers 54 (November 2015), http:// www . ifri . org / sites / default / files / atoms / files 
/ pp54adamsky . pdf.
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nuclear policy—in par tic u lar, the possibility that Rus sia could envision a “de- escalatory” nuclear 
strike in conjunction with conventional aggression on the eastern flank of NATO.3
Rus sia’s published national security strategy and military doctrine officially contemplate nuclear 
strikes only in response to use of weapons of mass destruction against Rus sia or in a situation 
where Rus sia’s very existence is threatened.4 However, counter parts  were uncertain (1) how Rus sia 
would define a threat to its existence; (2)  whether  there are classified ele ments of its nuclear 
doctrine that contradict the published strategies; and (3)  whether Rus sia’s po liti cal leadership 
would conform to doctrine in a crisis or seek to proj ect unpredictability as a way to help it prevail. 
They add that the danger of proliferation outside the Euro- Atlantic region, combined with growing 
nuclear forces in countries already possessing such weapons, further underscores the need for 
NATO to reemphasize its nuclear deterrent.
In general, analysts in the Baltic States and Poland viewed the nuclear challenge as fundamentally 
political— a threat intended to raise the stakes and divide NATO allies. Rus sia would succeed only if 
it weakened allied solidarity sufficiently to render NATO unable to respond to Rus sian aggression. 
From their perspective, a po liti cal challenge requires, first and foremost, a po liti cal response—to 
convince Rus sia (or any other potential nuclear adversary) that  there is no reasonable prospect of 
fracturing alliance unity and that crossing the nuclear threshold would invite incalculable risks. 
Counter parts in all countries identified a need for a stronger NATO declaratory stance on nuclear 
issues in light of Rus sia’s threatening rhe toric and irresponsible be hav ior.
Beyond declaratory mea sures,  there  were differences of emphasis on further steps NATO should 
take. Some in the Baltic States and Poland suggested a strengthened nuclear posture.  Others 
argued to incorporate more nuclear scenarios into NATO exercises and to develop graduated 
response options.  There  were also calls to consider including central Eu ro pean allies in NATO’s 
nuclear sharing arrangements by developing their dual- capable aircraft capabilities.  These aircraft 
could be based, they thought, in countries that already host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, thereby 
not requiring the basing of nuclear weapons or delivery platforms on the territory of newer mem-
bers. Alternatively, a minority view held that the deployment of NATO forces to the eastern flank, 
along with other mea sures to strengthen conventional deterrence, actually minimized the need for 
an enhanced nuclear posture given that nuclear weapons  were no longer necessarily needed to 
compensate for conventional weakness.
U.S. participants emphasized the need to revitalize the discussion of NATO’s nuclear deterrent, 
which has largely receded from public consciousness since the end of the Cold War. With nuclear 
threats playing a frequent role in Rus sian attempts to intimidate its neighbors, it was seen as vital 
3.  For an analy sis of Rus sia’s approach to nuclear weapons, changes in doctrine since the end of the Cold War, and 
 whether “de- escalatory” nuclear use is envisioned by Rus sia, see Olga Oliker, Rus sia’s Nuclear Doctrine: What We 
Know, What We  Don’t, and What That Means (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), 
https:// csis - prod . s3 . amazonaws . com / s3fs - public / publication / 160504 _ Oliker _ RussiasNuclearDoctrine _ Web . pdf.
4.  Russian Federation, “National Security Strategy of the Rus sian Federation,” December 2015, http:// static . kremlin . ru 
/ media / events / files / ru / l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v . pdf; Rus sian Federation, “Military Doctrine of the Rus sian 
Federation,” December 2014, https:// www . offiziere . ch / wp - content / uploads - 001 / 2015 / 08 / Russia - s - 2014 - Military 
- Doctrine . pdf.
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that public understanding and support for NATO’s nuclear policy remain solid. Representatives of 
the eastern flank countries saw this as a less pressing issue given their belief that their par tic u lar 
populations  were more keenly aware and supportive of the role nuclear deterrence played in 
alliance security. Regardless, all agreed that if enhanced public discourse strengthened solidarity 
among Eu ro pean allies, and in par tic u lar in the basing countries, it would have a clear benefit.
The operational posture and modernization of nuclear forces, including delivery platforms, was 
also a priority from the viewpoint of American experts, as was allied burden sharing. Sustaining 
broad participation in the nuclear mission was seen as crucial to alliance cohesion, including, for 
example, pending decisions in some allied nations on dual- capable aircraft that are part of  
NATO’s nuclear mission. Greater participation by nonnuclear allies in NATO nuclear exercises 
would likewise demonstrate concrete action by allies to deepen the credibility of this  
assurance.5
 There was also a pervasive atmosphere of unease and mistrust among  those we spoke with re-
garding Rus sia’s denial that it is in violation of the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 
According to our interlocutors, Rus sia’s deceit on this issue undermines productive dialogue and 
transparency mea sures meant to manage risk across a broader range of issues. Polish counter-
parts felt that the INF violation justified “tough language and consequences.” While the violation 
does not affect the strategic balance between the United States and Rus sia, it does raise the 
possibility that most Eu ro pean territory could become vulnerable to nuclear strikes from advanced 
Rus sian cruise missiles, thus increasing the pressure within NATO to develop a commensurate 
response.
 There was a reluctance among most Washington analysts to advocate developing capabilities that 
match tit- for- tat all of Rus sia’s purported capabilities. They preferred to instead focus on retaining 
the ability to impose overwhelming costs on an adversary. They thought the central role of the 
U.S. arsenal in NATO strategic deterrence provides credibility without requiring a mirroring of 
Rus sian capabilities or activity. Besides, they argued, a shift in U.S. or NATO nuclear policy could 
also entail po liti cal risks, as it might raise fears in NATO electorates (especially in basing countries) 
that NATO— rather than Russia— was contemplating lowering the nuclear threshold. Over time, this 
could weaken the broad public support for the nuclear mission that is essential to cohesion.
Unsurprisingly, the communiqué from the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw (which took place 
 after the research phase of this study) devoted significantly more attention to nuclear deterrence 
issues than its recent pre de ces sors. In it, allied leaders highlighted the fundamental purpose of 
nuclear weapons— “to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression”— and warned that 
NATO is prepared and able to impose costs on an adversary if the fundamental security of an ally 
 were threatened.6 This warning in the direction of Moscow— that nuclear use or coercion would 
be unacceptably risky—is the most explicit the alliance has been since 1999 and reverses a post– 
Cold War trend  toward more ambiguous discussion of NATO’s nuclear component. It likewise 
5.  Jeffrey Rathke and Simond Galbert, “NATO’s Nuclear Policy as Part of a Revitalized Deterrence Strategy,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, January 2016, https:// www . csis . org / analysis / nato%E2%80%99s - nuclear - policy - part 
- revitalized - deterrence - strategy.
6.  NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.”
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demonstrates a remarkable level of cohesion around the fact that NATO  will not be intimidated 
by nuclear threats and bolsters NATO’s overall deterrence policy based on “an appropriate mix of 
nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.”7
All interlocutors agreed that peace and stability in Eu rope could hinge on Rus sia’s policies and 
actions. While the alliance’s deterrence mea sures seek to influence Rus sia’s risk calculation, 
encourage responsible be hav ior and restraint, and thus render conflict less likely, this cannot be 
guaranteed. A key question  going forward  will be  whether Rus sia is prepared to engage in con-
structive dialogue on nuclear issues and strategic stability.
7.  Ibid.
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 Future Challenges to  
Transatlantic Cohesion
Cohesion is the bedrock on which the transatlantic alliance rests and also its greatest strength; 
this is a foundational princi ple but can easily be taken for granted. Does cohesion produce a unified 
response that is greater than the sum of its parts, or is it achieved only at the lowest common 
denominator?  There are recent examples of both: All 28 allies are contributing to NATO’s assur-
ance and deterrence efforts and to the global co ali tion to  counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), signaling unity and resolve in meeting challenges to both the east and south. How-
ever, specific contributions to each effort vary dramatically among nations, and differing priorities 
and threat perceptions have moderated the alliance’s level of ambition with regard to both mis-
sions.1 Allies in the east are predictability more focused on the Rus sia challenge and, as discussed 
in Section 3,  there remains lingering resentment among  those we spoke with regarding certain 
alliance decisions that they view as overly restrained or cautious (e.g., NRFA and VJTF). Allies more 
focused on southern threats have likewise signaled dis plea sure about the tepid NATO response to 
the threat of terrorism, foreign fighters, the strategic implications of the civil war in Syria, the flow 
of mi grants, and the fragile stability of key partners in the region.
The challenges to transatlantic cohesion in responding to modern threats are both internal and 
external. Internally, challenges to cohesion have po liti cal and economic roots. De cades of under-
investment in defense by many Eu ro pean allies has caused defense capabilities to atrophy and 
sowed divisions among allies. Robert Gates, the then U.S. secretary of defense, addressed the 
growing divide at his final Defense Ministerial in 2011:
In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two- tiered alliance: 
Between members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, 
peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and  those conducting the “hard” combat 
1.  Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the  People of Eu rope,” White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary (speech, Hannover, Germany, April 25, 2016), https:// www . whitehouse . gov / the - press - office / 2016 / 04 / 25 
/ remarks - president - obama - address - people - europe; NATO, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan,” fact sheet, July 2016, 
http:// www . nato . int / nato _ static _ fl2014 / assets / pdf / pdf _ 2016 _ 07 / 20160627 _ 1607 - factsheet - rap - en . pdf.
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missions. Between  those willing and able to pay the price and bear the bur-
dens of alliance commitments, and  those who enjoy the benefits of NATO 
membership—be they security guarantees or headquarters billets— but  don’t 
want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hy po thet i cal worry. 
We are  there  today. And it is unacceptable.2
War fatigue from the enduring operations in Af ghan i stan and Iraq is another  factor impacting 
cohesion as public support for and confidence in military interventions has decreased more 
broadly. Additionally, years of uneven economic growth in Eu rope have gone hand- in- glove with  
a populist turn in politics that often has illiberal streaks, indicating an internal vulnerability in the 
values that have traditionally formed the basis of transatlantic unity and cooperation.
Externally, Rus sian asymmetric activities throughout Eu rope, as well as the threat of conventional 
and nuclear warfare, bind all members of the transatlantic alliance. However, as mentioned, national 
assessments of the principal threat differ. The Baltic States and Poland have pivoted  toward a more 
active role in deterring Rus sian cross- border aggression, including hosting military exercises and 
multinational forces, with help from framework nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Germany) and  others contributing to a per sis tent force presence. Meanwhile, nations 
such as Italy, Turkey, and France have tended to place more focus more on the challenges to NATO’s 
south. Participants emphasized that allies cannot solely focus on narrow security interests but 
must seek opportunities to contribute across the spectrum of the security response. Examples of 
mea sures suggested by our interlocutors included the Baltic States and Poland contributing naval 
vessels to address the flow of mi grants in the Mediterranean, as well as providing logistical and 
training support for the  counter- ISIL co ali tion. They also thought it should be a priority that countries 
on the southern flank participate in the multinational forces that form the enhanced deterrence 
presence in the east.
Moreover, the external threats facing Eu rope, such as migration and terrorism, do not conform to 
the bound aries of transatlantic and Eu ro pean institutions: the security of the EU’s external border 
and the functioning of its Schengen Zone depend on intense cooperation with non- EU- member 
Turkey, while an effective NATO posture in the east and north requires stronger defense engage-
ment and planning with non- NATO partners Finland and Sweden. While NATO and the EU have 
made pro gress in practical cooperation in recent years, the issues preventing stronger formal 
institutional ties remain and may not be resolved quickly. Thus, at the Eu ro pean level,  there is an 
ongoing prob lem of coordination between a principally civilian institution (the EU) and a primarily 
military one (NATO), which mirrors in some ways the prob lems national governments face in 
civil- military cooperation and between the government and the private sector, for example, on 
cyber defense. The reliance of eastern flank countries on NATO and the U.S. military for security 
leaves a gap with the civilian and civilian- military security tasks that NATO is less well positioned to 
address. Pop u lar skepticism about the EU, which in some cases is abetted by national govern-
ments, further weakens the ability of the EU to play its full and essential role in security.
2.  Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda,” U.S. Department of Defense 
(speech, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011), http:// archive . defense . gov / Transcripts / Transcript . aspx ? TranscriptID​=​4839.
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Interlocutors from the Baltic States and Poland  were also concerned by the perception that the 
United States, which has long acted as a balancing force in Eu ro pean politics, has retreated from 
its traditional leading role in forging common transatlantic approaches to diverse po liti cal and 
security challenges. This is connected in part to a sense that prevailed before 2014 that the most 
impor tant Eu ro pean issues for the United States had been resolved by post– Cold War reforms in 
the former socialist countries; by the enlargement of NATO and the EU; and by the deepening 
integration within the EU. For its part, EU members have in recent years sent fewer demand signals 
for an activist Washington stance on Eu rope’s internal challenges.
At the same time, burden sharing, a perennial irritant to the U.S.- European relationship, has been 
too slow to improve. This is no longer a topic of interest only for the circle of Washington Transat-
lanticists. It has become a central part of the national po liti cal debate in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. If pro gress on burden sharing remains marginal, the readiness of the U.S. Congress and 
the broader public to devote resources and make sacrifices for transatlantic security  will be 
impacted.
Since the Rus sian intervention in Ukraine, the tide has begun to turn on the financial aspects of 
burden sharing within NATO. Allies agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit to “aim to move  toward” the 
spending target of 2  percent of GDP, although the commitment was over a 10- year period and, 
in light of the economic uncertainty in the euro zone, it was conditioned on continued economic 
growth.3 While only five allies meet the target now, two of  those are on the eastern flank (Poland 
and Estonia), and at least 20 of 28 allies increased defense spending in real terms in 2016.4 As noted 
previously, Lithuania and Latvia both have been increasing spending rapidly and are committed 
to reaching the 2  percent level by 2018.  These commitments have not been sufficient, however, to 
reverse a growing public sense in the United States that Eu ro pean allies are “ free riders.”
Cohesion is to a certain degree a learned be hav ior that must constantly be relearned. It is a result 
of common strategic interests and of having institutions and forms of cooperation that are attuned 
to the challenges of the current day or  those that may emerge. Our study revealed a strong degree 
of cohesion between the Baltic States and Poland on the core issues of their security. We likewise 
found a high degree of alignment between government officials and the members of civil society 
we spoke with regarding the desired responses and support from the United States and NATO, 
along with a deep public awareness of the conventional and nuclear threats facing the region. 
In keeping with both the internal assessments of their governments and the external demands of 
their populations, the Baltic States and Poland are making positive strides in devoting significant 
national resources to strengthening their defenses and to sustaining NATO’s focus on the eastern 
flank. While  there  were some divergences among them regarding specifics, it was clear from our 
interactions across the region that  there is more that unites  these nations than divides them.
3.  NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” press release, September 5, 2014, http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / official 
_ texts _ 112964 . htm.
4.  Jens Stoltenberg, “Pre- Ministerial Press Conference,” NATO (meeting of the North Atlantic Council Defense Minis-
ters, Brussels, Belgium, June 13, 2016), http:// www . nato . int / cps / en / natohq / opinions _ 132272 . htm ? selectedLocale​=​en.
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